United Nations, sidelined?

By Bipin Adhikari
22 June 2006
The Kathmandu Post
http://english.ohmynews.com/reader_opinion2/opinion_view.asp?code=2076418&menu=c10400&no=301144&rel_no=1&page=1&isSerial=&sort_name=&ip_sort=85.159.201.52

Turning conflict into peace is challenging even if those attempting to do it are highly trained and well-equipped. Several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements. This is the reason that every peace process should have a credible peace facilitator.

The United Nations has a long experience in mediating and implementing peace agreements. It has enough know-how in garnering broad based political coalition to solve conflict, and ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner. This is the reason why many people in Nepal are demanding that the United Nations be involved in the peace process in Nepal as a facilitator.

Last week, Matthew Kahane, the United Nations (UN) Resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator, rightly remarked that the current ceasefire agreement (code of conduct) between the Nepal government and the Maoist party is too general and needs to include many specific provisions. It doesn't talk about the number of armies on both sides; and the questions like who are commanding the armies; where the soldiers are kept; is their uniform identifiable or not; who are actually in the armies, etc are left unanswered.

Kahane was right on the issue when he said the code of conduct should be detailed to such an extent that it should talk about the numbers of guns, tagging those guns with numbers, keeping them inside an alarm enabled armor with as much as three keys- "two of them will be with the two sides and one will be with us." Had the SPA government and the Maoists little sense, they should have adopted the ceasefire agreement that the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal had submitted to them just few weeks before for their consideration.

In the days ahead, the government will have to take further crucial decisions involving a wide range of complex tasks that often require the combined use of military, police and civilian capabilities to define and enforce the code of conduct. Operational concepts emerge from these mandated tasks, which need greater clarity in their application. They include protection of civilians, security sector reform, DDR (disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation), extension of state authority, organization of free, fair and transparent elections, and support to national transitional processes.

All these issues require mature facilitators. There has been significant support in Nepal for the role of the UN in four major areas of the peace process: (1) facilitation of peace dialogue and witnessing of decisions (2) guidance in best international practices (3) cease-fire monitoring and (4) assisting the government in decommissioning of Maoist arms and demobilization of the Maoist militia (prior to constituent assembly elections). Unfortunately, Nepal has never been referred to the Security Council and, perhaps even more surprisingly, no steps have ever been taken by the Secretary-General to establish a special representative in the country.

It was the United Kingdom, the first and foremost ally of Nepal, which appointed a special representative to Nepal to help with the peace process. As a British member of Parliament, Sir John Stanley, remarked on 22 June 2005, "I welcomed the appointment of Sir Jeffrey James as the special representative. The parliamentary group had beneficial contact with him throughout the time that he held the post. The need for a special representative is even greater now than when Sir Jeffrey James was appointed, especially with the assumption of autocratic power by King Gyanendra. Yet Sir Jeffrey James has retired and not been replaced."Till date Sir Stanley is not duly responded by the concerned British Minister why a successor has not been appointed and who is taking on the responsibilities that were previously discharged by Sir Jeffrey James. The frustration of a person who understands the complications can be noted when he says: "I hope that the Minister can assure us that the fact that there has been no successor to Sir Jeffrey James in no way suggests a diminution in the priority that the British Government give Nepal."

Why the British government has got off on the wrong foot is a question that needs to be properly analyzed. But the way some other countries which also offered political assistance to the peace initiative like Norway, Denmark and the European Union were also ignored explain the same phenomenon. Even now the Swiss government is offering what Nepal might need to facilitate dialogue, peace and reconciliation; but there is hardly any response either from the SPA government or the Maoists. Both the government and its armed opposition have become victim of the invisible pressure not to involve any transparent procedure and third-party facilitation, which could empower everybody and harm none. It is difficult to rationalize the decision to dissolve the House of Representatives (allegedly reinstated by the force of mass movement) without proper guarantee of a deliberative process until the constituent assembly is elected. Similarly, bringing the Maoists on board as the constituent of the proposed interim government without first categorically renouncing violence by them cannot be a responsible act of any civilian government.

There has never been a demand for promulgation of the interim constitution from the democratic side so far. The drive is no more than an attempt to do away with the basic structures of the existing Constitution, and the net safety that it has assured to the nation. It was possible to accommodate the demands of the Maoists by amending the existing Constitution, and giving to it an interim status acceptable to all. It is surprising that all these crucial decisions were made after setting aside first what has been lauded as the "sovereign' House of Representatives.

The force that is unrepresented in all this undertaking is the mass that has either been left out, or is lacking in power to speak up for fear of violence and persecution. This is a clear case of the "winners-take-all" rule. It does not help the quest for a sustainable democracy.

In fact, Nepal is not a typical 'peacekeeping' subject. It is not a case of building a new state from scratch, or reconstructing a war-torn society, from all angles. The state still has full ability to provide security-or 'renationalize' the use of force and the prevention of violence within society- once the insurgents decommission arms. There is a functioning system of law and order within the society. There are necessary legal and administrative structures. All that was needed was a small group of UN political advisors facilitating the peace process in all four major areas noted above rescuing the peace process from misadventure and various external and internal sabotages.

A group of advisors of this type, not necessarily more than a dozen senior experts, was all that was necessary to ensure a peace process that could address all tough and poignant questions. Even the size of the UN operations for the demobilization purpose needs to be discussed more. What was needed was a political back up of the Security Council appointed advisors, working with the professional bureaucracy of Nepal, and the government of the day, rather than nitty-gritty of UN peacekeeping, or DDR process.

By sidelining the UN without giving enough justifications, the SPA government and its Maoist counterpart have explained what are their political weaknesses, and for whom they have brought the fate of Nepalese people under the growing black cloud of invisible forces. They still have time to break their bondage and shackles and come forward with the revised offer to use the UN peace assistance and resources without hesitation. Unless the UN is on board, it is least likely that the enthusiastic European countries can give a hand to the peace process.